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ABSTRACT 
Boundaries have become significant foci of 
interdisciplinary research during the last 
decade, but their roles have not been dis­
cussed very often in the context of tourism 
which, in fact, is crucially linked with many 
contemporary tendencies such as the open­
ing of borders between formerly closed 
realms of the world or flows of capital and 
people. This paper analyses the historical 
and geographical roles of the Finnish­
Russian border in relation to tourism. The 
border was strictly guarded and almost en­
tirely closed in Soviet times. It was a taboo 
that interested many foreign visitors to Fin­
land. It interested the Finns as well, because 
on the other side was the ceded area of 
Karelia that had been part of Finland before 
the war but which was now totally inacces­
sible to foreign visitors or former residents. 
It was also the transformation zone of 
imagined cultural landscapes. When the 
physical border shifted westward after the 
war, so did the Karelian cultural landscape 
and its representations. Since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union the border has become 
much more open and tourism has increased 
enormously. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Boundaries have become increasingly sig­
nificant foci of social and cultural research 
in the last 10 years or so, largely in response 
to the collapse of the rigid global geopoliti­
cal division between the eastern and western 
blocs, and the simultaneous increase in eco­
nomic and human (refugees, migrants, tour­
ists) flows has made the changing roles of 
boundaries particularly topical. Where bor­
der research has by tradition been a special 
area of political geography, it has now be­
come increasingly an interdisciplinary field. 
Furthermore, boundaries are understood not 
merely as physical entities but also as meta­
phorical and symbolic elements (18, 16). 
State boundaries in particular have for a 
long time, at least from the beginning of the 
current century, been understood as fixed, 
stable and concrete entities which divide the 
global space into bounded units and which 
change mainly as a consequence of conflicts 
between territorial powers (28). They have 
been understood as the key markers of sov­
ereignty-not only physical markers but 
also symbolic and cultural ones. The exis­
tence of national identities and the continual 
legitimation and signification of boundaries 
have thus been understood as two sides of 
the same coin. Much scientific research has 
also contributed to this state-centred outlook 
on the world. As far as the acceptance of 
nation and state as given are concerned, Ag­
new talks about methodological nationalism, 
noting that this idea has lain behind both 
mainstream and much radical social science 
(1 ). Methodological nationalism also effec­
tively implies a view of the world as a grid 
of territories with more or less exclusive 
boundaries. 
Following the radical changes in the global 
geopolitical landscape, boundaries are now 
increasingly being interpreted as vanishing 
elements in spatial transform rather than sta­
ble physical lines. This will, as many schol­
ars have argued, reduce the meanings of 
state boundaries and sovereignty and, fi­
nally, lead to de-territorialization and re­
territorialization, i.e. changes in the func­
tions and meanings of boundaries. These 
notions are commonly associated with the 
works of the well-known philosophers 
Deleuze and Guattari, who developed them 
to describe the effects of capitalism on pre­
vious fixed orders of class, kinship and 
space, but they have become much-used 
metaphors for cultural, social and spatial 
change in the current geopolitical literature 
(18). 
Much of the re-/de-territorializing discourse 
is linked with the ideas of globalization or 
the economic, cultural and environmental 
transformation of the global space. Scholars 
are not unanimous about the meanings of 
this phenomenon or its effects on global­
local relations and on boundaries, but the 
new rhetoric reflects changes in global ac­
tivity spaces. This rhetoric often represents 
boundaries as symbols of a past world char­
acterized by the space of places that will be 
replaced by a dynamic world characterized 
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by a space of flows, to employ the concepts 
of Castells ( 4 ). This flow rhetoric is persua­
sive and has been used increasingly in many 
contexts. The space of flows, it is often ar­
gued, will reduce the roles of the 'sover­
eignty' and 'identities' of states and chal­
lenge national identities and boundaries. 
Side-by-side with these tendencies, nation­
alism and ethno-regionalism, linked with the 
flows of displaced people and refugees, are 
creating new boundaries and challenging the 
relations between existing social and physi­
cal spaces. In many cases this has given rise 
to conflicts and the drawing of new bounda­
ries between social groups, 1.e. re­
territorialization. 
In spite of the new interest in all kinds of 
'flows' across boundaries in the contempo­
rary world, scholars have not paid much at­
tention to the roles of boundaries from the 
perspective of tourism. Besides its immense 
economic role in the contemporary world, 
tourism is a field where border crossings 
occur on all spatial scales, from personal and 
local to global, from sub-national boundaries 
to international ones. In this context borders 
may be landscape elements of value for 
tourism as such ( e.g. ideological or cultural 
borders) or they may be just obstacles that 
manifest themselves as 'friction' restraining 
movement. A few authors have evaluated 
the meanings of borders for tourism and 
cross-border shopping the last few decades, 
but as shown by Timothy (29, 30; see also 
3 ), the mapping of the links between tourism 
and borders has been a marginal topic for 
both political geographers and tourism re­
searchers. 
This paper aims to provide some theoretical 
and concrete ideas for border studies in con­
nection with tourism and to serve as a back­
ground to a discussion of the arguments that 
have been put forward regarding the 'disap­
pearance of boundaries' ( and nation-states) 
in the current world. Some theoretical per­
spectives will be discussed that might be 
useful for multidimensional boundary stud­
ies. The key argument is that instead of un­
derstanding boundaries as fixed lines, we 
should understand them as more multidi­
mensional phenomena. 
Boundaries are not only lines but meaning­
ful, historically-contingent symbols and in­
stitutions which are in many ways sedi­
mented in social practices and discourses, 
and which manifest themselves on different 
spatial scales, from personal and local to 
global (17, 18). This means that an under­
standing of the contemporary meanings of 
specific boundaries requires several 'keys' 
which are linked with economics, politics, 
administration and governance as well as 
with legislation and local and national/local 
attitudes/identities. All these elements re­
flect power relations in complicated ways. 
Boundaries may be simultaneously histori­
cal, natural, cultural, political or symbolic 
phenomena and each of the above elements 
may be exploited in diverging ways in the 
construction of territoriality and the ideas of 
borders as prohibiting and allowing spatial 
interaction-including tourism. 
Borders may exist as one part of the 'discur­
sive landscape' of social power which ex­
tends itself into the whole of society and is 
produced and reproduced in various social 
and cultural practices and discourses. This 
means that different borders may have dif­
ferent meanings in different contexts. 
Therefore, as has been suggested earlier ( 1 7, 
18), it is crucial to approach borders con­
textually. The context is not merely a spe­
cific border area in itself, as has typically 
been the case in traditional border studies in 
political geography, for each border receives 
its meanings from broader contexts in the 
societies in question and from the links be­
tween these societies and larger geopolitical, 
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cultural and economic contexts. It is also 
crucial to approach borders historically, 
since their meanings are not stable but 
change as the contexts change. 
To illustrate these points, we will analyse 
the historical development and geographical 
roles of the Finnish-Russian border in rela­
tion to tourism. The meanings of this border 
have varied greatly in the course of the years 
both in Finland and in Russia, and the pre­
vailing, dominant interpretations have pro­
vided different possibilities for tourism. Be­
fore World War II it was the ultimate barrier 
and dividing line that separated the East 
from the West and essentially eliminated 
tourism but, since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, it has become much more open and 
tourism has increased markedly. 
FINNISH-RUSSIAN BORDER LAND­
SCAPES AND TOURISM BEFORE 
WORLD WAR II 
The Finnish-Russian boundary and border 
area are located partly in the area of Karelia, 
where the western and eastern cultures meet. 
Its location has changed many times as a 
consequence of territorial disputes. From 
World War II onward this border was the 
longest ideological boundary between a 
western capitalist state and the Soviet Un­
ion. Finnish-Russian border areas have for a 
long time been characterized by the signs of 
national peripherality: dependence on re­
source-based industries, the large signifi­
cance of the public sector in employment 
and low population density. Therefore the 
recent opening of the border to tourism and 
other cross-border interactions may be seen 
as being of crucial importance for the devel­
opment of the peripheral areas on both sides 
and for integration of these areas into the 
wider economy. 
Finland became an autonomous state in the 
Russian Empire in 1809, after being part of 
Sweden for 600 years. This change was 
crucial, as it meant that the focus of the 
emerging flows of tourism moved eastwards 
and St. Petersburg became a new power 
centre for the upper classes. Autonomous 
Finland became a 'foreign country' for these 
classes and Finnish tourism services began 
to develop rapidly. Towards the end of the 
19th century, tourism emerged as a new in­
dustry in Eastern Finland. Some visitors 
were also interested in the border with Rus­
sia, the 'Bear of the East' (14, p. 119-120), 
and a particularly visible element in the 
emerging tourism landscape was the Teri­
joki villa area, established in the 1870s. 
This area was on the Finnish side of the bor­
der, but it emerged mainly as a result of the 
strong regional influence of St. Petersburg 
and the predilections of rich Russian fami­
lies. 
When Finland gained its independence in 
1917, this caused a very significant change 
in territorial strategy. Whereas the border 
between Finland and Russia had been open 
during the years of autonomy, the new inde­
pendent state had to secure its boundaries 
and use them to signify its territoriality. The 
boundary established in the Peace of Tartu 
(1920) was located on the same place as that 
of the Grand Duchy of Finland, but its prac­
tical significance was completely different. 
The power of the state was expressed in the 
border areas in the form of a border guard 
system and, thus, whereas interaction and 
communication over the boundary had been 
possible earlier, the new boundary was 
closed. 
The closure of the boundary marked a radi­
cal change in the conditions of life for the 
less developed areas of eastern and south­
eastern Finland and promoted both their 
economic peripheralization and altered sym-
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bolic and cultural roles as outposts of the 
western cultural realm. Commercial con­
nections with the east were severed (19), 
particularly with the significant economic 
sphere and market area centred on St. Pe­
tersburg. Illegal interaction over the bound­
ary occasionally took place, which caused 
diplomatic conflicts. The villa area of Teri­
joki now became a destination for Finnish 
tourists, and the new, closed border itself 
became an increasingly important object for 
the tourist gaze. Visits to Finnish border 
villages were recommended, particularly for 
the younger generations, the motives being 
bound up with ideological education as well 
as tourism (25, p. 126). 
Tourist Images of the Karelian 
Border Areas 
The Karelian area has never in its entirety 
been a part of Finland, but has been divided 
between Finland and Russia in various ways 
(Fig. 1 ). In spite of this, the Karelian heri­
tage is an integral part of the Finnish na­
tional culture and the landscapes of the re­
gion have been represented consistently for 
more than a hundred years as a part of the 
national imagery of Finland. The emer­
gence of the Karelian territorial myth can be 
traced to the rise of nationalism and a na­
tionalistic culture in 19th century Finland. 
An especially strong boost was given to this 
process by the publication of the Kalevala, 
the Finnish national epic, containing folk 
ballads collected from Karelia. This trans­
formed the popular impression of the re­
mote, primitive territory of Karelia as a dis­
tant, poor, miserable and backward forested 
borderland into that of a mythical seat of 
folk culture that has conserved its timeless 
natural wonders and cultural treasures over 
the centuries. Around the turn of the cen­
tury the Karelian culture in general and the 
Karelian landscape in particular were the 
main themes in the thinking of the national 
romantic movement of Finnish artists and 
intellectuals. Painters, writers, architects 
and composers as well as folklorists, histori­
ans and geographers were seeking their in­
spiration from the natural scenery and cul­
tural environments of this region. Soon the 
eastern forests and the expanses of hills and 
lakes were being regarded as an ideal Fin­
nish landscape and a fundamental part of the 
national landscape gallery (22, p. 118-119). 
But the eastern borderlands of Finnish 
Karelia were not only a part of the ideal rep­
resentation of a nation state, they were also 
an area of cultural otherness, the core area of 
the Finnish Orthodox culture. Before the 
Second World War, most of the Orthodox 
population lived in the eastern part of Fin­
land, mostly in the Karelian borderlands, 
and it was also in this region that the visible 
traits of Orthodox culture--churches, chap­
els and cemeteries-were seen in the local 
landscape more frequently and more power­
fully than anywhere else in Finland. In 
other words, it was the heartland of a Fin­
nish-Karelian Orthodox culture. 
Before the Second World War, the Finnish 
Orthodox Church had some 70,000 mem­
bers, less than one percent of the total 
population (11). Even in Finnish Karelia the 
Orthodox represented only a small minority 
among the inhabitants, but their different 
religion, their ties with Russian culture and 
the fact that they lived near the border made 
them a visible element in the processes of 
nationalization that took place in the periph­
eral areas of the young nation. 
The territorial aim of boundary reinforce­
ment in the 1920s and 1930s was national 
integration within Finland. A great effort 
was made in developing the peripheral bor­
der areas and improving the living condi­
tions of their inhabitants. The key motive 
was to foster a spirit of nationalism and to 
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increase the political reliability of the popu­
lation. While these activities are a good ex­
pression of the nationalization of peripher­
ies, it was at the same time difficult for the 
local people to comprehend why they had 
been 'relocated' into a periphery and why 
their rights, which once extended fairly 
freely across the border, now had to be cur­
tailed (17). During the 1920s the boundary 
became a symbol through which both the 
distinction between Finland and the Soviet 
Union and their dependence on each other 
were expressed. The meanings of the 
boundary were hence effectively politicized. 
The inhabitants of the Karelian borderlands 
were especially under scrutiny. Because the 
core area of the Orthodox Church was also 
the border area between Finland and the So­
viet Union, the loyalty and patriotism of its 
inhabitants was vital to the state authorities. 
Thus the nationalization processes had two 
goals: to integrate the Orthodox people 
more deeply into Finnish society-which 
served the needs of national security and 
defence-and to represent them and their 
cultural landscape to the rest of the Finns as 
an essential, if peculiar, part of the nation 
(22, p. 118-125). 
Travel and tourism was one significant strat­
egy that was adopted to make the borderland 
area of Karelia and its culture known nation­
wide. Travel within Finland, and especially 
in the borderlands, was seen as a part of the 
process of nationalization, designed to 
strengthen the feeling of togetherness and 
thus to foster a sense of an 'imagined com­
munity' called Finland, a community with 
clearly-defined borders (2). As Siiskonen 
(25, p. 124) writes, domestic tourism was 
understood as significant both for 'national 
integration' and for the 'spiritual and physi­
cal condition of youngsters' and 'the will for 
national defence'. 
The tourist images of the Karelian border 
areas in the 1920s and 1930s were of a land­
scape of cultural peculiarity, but not too pe­
culiar. Under the national tourist gaze, the 
borderland Orthodox culture and the local 
landscape were used to symbolize the Kale­
vala heritage, local religion, a sense of 
community and the conservative values of 
traditional country life.. These images pre­
sented Orthodox Karelia as different, strange 
and extraordinary, but at the same time very 
familiar and, above all, very Finnish. It was 
a territory where, in the stereotypic words of 
contemporary travel books and brochures, 
there lived a lively, talkative, colourful peo­
ple known as the Karelians who, despite 
their different dialect, habits and faith, were 
Finns in exactly the same way as everybody 
else. Thus the Karelian Orthodox culture 
acquired meanings associated with the val­
ues of both ancient and national aspirations, 
allowing the local Orthodox culture and its 
landscape elements to be seen as parts of 
wider nationalization processes in the border 
areas (22, p. 118-128). 
Even the Orthodox monasteries which still 
existed in Karelia, and which were mostly 
seen as strange, medieval Russian institu­
tions that had no place in an independent, 
Lutheran, western Finland, were now toler­
ated. The monastery of Valamo, for exam­
ple, was classified as one of the sights on the 
main tourist route through Finland. It was 
now a place that offered tourists a sense of 
the East, an opportunity to take a look at a 
Russian culture that no longer existed else­
where (25, p. 130). For the emerging tourist 
industry of a young nation, it offered a feel­
ing of otherness within the home country at 
relatively low cost (23). 
The tourist image of the Karelian border­
lands was hence both discriminating and 
connective. The distinctive images of the 
local culture and its traits were presented 
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and tolerated while at the same time ethnic, 
cultural, and historical unity with the rest of 
the nation were stressed. Thus, the nation­
alistic element was a fundamental underpin­
ning of the emerging tourist traffic. 
The border itself also held some excitement 
for tourism, again very much in the nation-
. alistic sense. The waterways which were 
part of the Finnish-Soviet border up to 
World War II became significant symbols of 
the border for the Finns. The River Rajajoki 
in particular became a national landscape, 
and the Rajajoki bridge took on the status of 
an internationally-renowned crossing point 
between the two worlds, a place that western 
tourists often visited. Russian refugees re­
ferred to this place as the "Gate to Hell" 
(17). In the Finnish national rhetoric, even 
the physical environment of the river repre­
sented a strong symbolic border between 
two major European landscape regions: the 
"Finnish" and "West European" Karelian 
Isthmus to the west and the "Russian" and 
"East European" grass steppe to the east (20, 
p. 37-38). Consequently, the physical land­
scape in the other parts of Karelia, especially
the Baltic Shield as a common bedrock un­
derlying the Scandinavian areas from the
Atlantic to the White Sea, was seen as an
area of homogeneity and thereby as a part of
the natural region of Greater Finland (13).
THE KARELIAN TOURIST 
LANDSCAPE SINCE 1945 
Rebuilt Uniqueness 
World War II changed the situation perma­
nently on both the symbolic and the con­
crete, material level. Finland was forced to 
cede to the Soviet Union huge territories that 
included the Petsamo and Salla areas in 
Lapland and most parts of Karelia, which 
together constituted about 10% of the total 
area of the nation-state. This also meant that 
420,000 refugees had to leave their homes 
(12, p. 86). Evacuation marked the end of 
the previous cultural territorial system and 
the beginning of a new one. The closing of 
the border at its new location as a conse­
quence of the Second World War altered the 
spatial dimensions of the Karelian territorial 
myth once again. In the new situation most 
of the Karelian heritage, including the bor­
der landscapes, had to be re-created and re­
invented in the areas that remained on the 
Finnish side. 
After the war, images of the ceded areas 
were removed from the national landscape 
gallery, although they continued to exist as 
distant landscapes of nostalgia-the beauti­
ful and beloved lost Karelia ( 6, p. 109). A 
new Karelian landscape now had to be 
found inside the Finnish territorial borders. 
Fortunately a candidate territory still existed 
in the new eastern border area, the region 
called Northern Karelia, and quite soon after 
the war its hilly, lakeside landscape came to 
be treated as a new icon of Karelia itself ( 1 7, 
24). 
In the 1950s, two new national parks, Ou­
lanka and Petkelj arvi, were created along the 
border, replacing the former ideal Karelian 
landscapes on the other side (6). Fortunately 
the old Karelian landscape symbol, the hill 
of Koli, still existed on the western side of 
the border, and this was represented as the 
dominant symbol of Finnish Karelia through 
a wide range of picture books and travel 
prospectuses. Koli became an important 
travel destination, partly on account of the 
beauty of its physical landscapes and partly 
because it symbolized the Karelian heritage 
(24). 
Thus it was not just the physical environ­
ment of Northern Karelia that fitted into the 
framework of an ideal landscape, it was also 
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the cultural heritage of the area. Following 
the Second World War, the new border area 
of Northern Karelia was the only region 
where the Orthodox Church had once had a 
significant role as a part of the local culture. 
Nevertheless, Northern Karelia and its Or­
thod�x environment were different from the 
lost border territories. Despite the long his­
tory and tradition of the local Orthodox par­
ishes, the area actually lacked many of the 
visible features of that tradition (22, p. 208-
209). 
Regardless of the marginality of the local 
Orthodox heritage, a conscious representa­
tion and manifestation of this phenomenon 
began in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and 
from that time onwards the old symbols of 
the Karelian border areas such as national 
costumes, traditional Kalevala rune-singers 
and the Orthodox faith have been used to 
convey a popular impression of the region. 
In addition, the Orthodox culture has played 
a significant role as part of the local territo­
rial identity-building processes in Northern 
Karelia. There has been a desire to see both 
the visible and imagined Orthodox land­
scapes not only as a setting for the local 
Orthodox parishes but also as a distinctive 
feature of the whole territory, regardless of 
the fact that only around 7 percent of the 
local population belong to the Orthodox 
Church (22). 
The new "visibility" of the Orthodox culture 
in Northern Karelia has been manifested 
particularly in the most recent examples of 
the built environment, so that Orthodox 
features are present in the landscape today 
through various neo-traditional symbols and 
elements. New churches built according to 
the heritage of the Karelian wooden chapels, 
Greek-style "traveller's crosses" by the 
roadsides and traditional Karelian-Orthodox 
graveyard memorials are all representations 
of the emerging identity of the Finnish Or-
thodox population. In these cases, to be in 
the landscape is also to be seen in the land­
scape. On the other hand, these neo­
traditional manifestations and representa­
tions are also part of the intersubjective ter­
ritorial images created by tourism, which it 
is hoped will increase in Eastern Finland in 
general and in Northern Karelia in particu­
lar. Many of the newest elements in the tra­
ditional Orthodox landscape have been built 
with substantial support from the local 
authorities and tourist enterprises, and this 
introduces new elements into the meanings 
associated with the landscapes. These land­
scapes are now read and interpreted through 
the medium of the heritage industry, by 
tourists who expect to see them regardless of 
how genuine or otherwise they actually are 
(17, p. 129-131; 22, p. 222-234). 
In the case of a lost past and lost territories, 
the notion of nostalgia is a key element in 
heritage interpretation. The word nostalgia 
is normally used to mean a longing for 
something from the past, including a longing 
to escape from the present to past times and 
places and. to the social structures related to 
them (9). Karelia and its landscapes, both 
those remaining within the national borders 
and those on the other side of the border, 
have been implicated in continuous proc­
esses of nostalgia. In post-war Northern 
Karelia this has been manifested as a distinct 
heritage and a set of memories related partly 
to the lost territories, and travel brochures 
and tourist advertisements since the 1960s 
have represented the region as a nostalgic, 
static land of memories (8). 
As a part of this heritage-making and sense 
of nostalgia, the historical sites and land­
scapes of the Second World War have 
emerged as borderland tourist attractions of 
a new kind. During the last ten years or so, 
all manner of war sites such as battlefields, 
old dugouts and pillboxes, and also heritage 
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centres and museums, have become a visible 
part of the historical landscape across the 
eastern borderlands, particularly along the 
tourist road of the Bard and Boundary (Fig. 
2). 
The tourist image of the present-day border 
area of Eastern Finland contains mixed ele­
ments of untouched, picturesque sights and 
cultural factors such as Orthodox environ­
ments and traditions, the heritage of the Ka­
levala and the historical battle sites of recent 
wars (5, p. 31). The eastern heritage, espe­
cially the Orthodox religious culture, is now 
seen as an essential part of this nostalgic im­
age of the area. The idealistic and nostalgic 
past and the imagined landscape related to it 
can be located in a distant, marginal border 
area, where they have been marked, con­
served and preserved, or even re-built or re­
produced, to meet the needs of modem 
heritage making and tourism. 
The Ideological Border as 
a Tourism Destination 
Looked at on the scale of world geopolitics, 
Finland belonged after World War II to the 
disputed, indeterminately neutral camp lo­
cated somewhere between East and West. 
Its eastern boundary became the longest in­
terface between the leading socialist state 
and a W estem capitalist state, over 1200 km 
in length. It also became a fitting illustra­
tion of an ideological boundary, and was 
quoted as such in political geography text­
books from time to time (21). 
The area became concomitantly an interest­
ing object for western tourists. Since the 
mid-1960s tourism has become an increas­
ingly crucial industry in these areas. As 
Kosonen and Pohjanen write: "(for these 
people) the mystical border between east 
and west was often an overwhelmingly in­
teresting object" (10, p. 451 ). This meant 
problems for the closed border, and more 
and more violations were recorded. Most 
foreigners travelling by car went to south­
eastern Finland, but since the border was 
closed and strictly controlled, the increase in 
tourism simply meant more work for the 
Finnish Border Guard Service. During the 
mid- l 960s, Kosonen and Pohjanen write, 
the border, frontier zone and border guard 
activities themselves became significant 
objects for tourists! More and more people 
were arrested in the frontier zone, but the 
number of actual illegal crossings remained 
very small. The increase in pressure on the 
border area was much greater in the south­
eastern part of the country than in Northern 
Finland, due mostly to the fact that access to 
the border areas was much more difficult in 
the northern periphery than in the southern 
part of the country. 
FROM A CLOSED BORDER 
TO AN OPEN ONE 
The collapse of the communist regime has 
radically altered the economic, political and 
military landscapes of Europe, and changes 
have also occurred in the peripheral areas 
around the Finnish-Russian border. The po­
litical and economic changes in eastern 
Europe have been crucial as far as the image 
of the border is concerned, and we have now 
entered a new stage in the interpretation of 
its roles and the establishment of economic 
practices. The idea is now emerging of the 
border as an interface, a point of contact or 
even a frontier with a new social and eco­
nomic significance based on personal inter­
action between traders. Its economic impli­
cations are now being realized increasingly 
extensively on both sides (19). The border 
area is expanding and the forms of interac­
tion are becoming more versatile. The for­
merly distant border areas are now turning 
into 'interdependent borderlands', to employ 
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the terms of Martinez (15). Many of the lo­
cal authorities on the Finnish and Russian 
sides have been ready to play an active role 
in this, hoping to open up routes and con­
nections in the future and thereby develop 
the economics of both areas. 
Even though interaction over the boundary 
has increased markedly, the border still is a 
line between two completely different so­
cieties, and the gap in the standards of living 
is among the largest in the world. Hence, it 
is probable that the Finnish-Russian bound­
ary will continue in the near future to be 
relatively strictly controlled on both sides. 
These areas will not be transformed very 
quickly into 'integrated borderlands' where 
unrestricted movements of people, goods, 
and ideas prevail ( 19). 
Although there had been extensive trade 
between Finland and the Soviet Union, the 
border had been strictly controlled and 
movement across had been permitted only in 
certain controlled places. This made some 
forms of tourism-mainly to the former 
Finnish city of Vyborg and to Leningrad­
possibly for the Finns, and also there were 
joint construction projects. Co-operation 
was nevertheless strictly regulated and or­
ganized at the state level. The Finnish 
economy was greatly dependent on Soviet 
trade, and more than 20% of Finnish exports 
went to the Soviet Union in 1985-86. With 
the decline of the Soviet system, exports 
collapsed, so that the proportion was only 
13% in 1990 and less than 3% in 1992 (27). 
Now it is rising again gradually, so that 6% 
of exports went to Russia in 1996 and 7 .1 % 
of imports came from there. Russia now 
ranks fifth among both the countries of des­
tination and the countries of origin in the 
Finnish foreign trade statistics (19). 
As far as the whole present border area, al­
most 1300 kilometres in length, is con-
cerned, 70 years of virtual inactivity had 
made the peripheral areas on both sides 
highly dependent on their own national po­
litical and economic centres. They had 
hence become typical 'alienated border­
lands' (15). Cross-border traffic began to 
intensify in many places around 1990, and 
the former Finnish 'city tourism' to Vyborg 
and Leningrad became increasingly a matter 
of business and shopping trips and visits 
made by people of Karelian origin to their 
former strictly-closed home areas. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union finally 
opened up Russian Karelia to tourism. 
\\Then the border became more open there 
were still about 180,000 ·of the Finnish refu­
gees from the region alive, and an immedi­
ate boom in nostalgic return journeys en­
sued, with a total of 1.26 million crossings 
of the border in 1991-1992. Every Finn be­
came familiar with TV programmes and 
newspaper photographs showing former 
refugees searching the fields and forests of 
Karelia for reminders of their lost homes 
and past spatial identities which had been 
broken off as a consequence of the war. 
These border crossings were visits to the lost 
past as much as journeys undertaken in the 
present ( 1 7). 
An almost completely new phenomenon has 
been the greater freedom of Russian travel 
to Finland. This can be seen clearly from 
the statistics. Where 8500 Russian cars 
crossed the Finnish border in 1991, for in­
stance, the figure five years later was almost 
170,000. Russian visitors spent a total of 
549,000 nights in Finland in 1997, which 
ranks them in second place after Swedish 
visitors (26). While relations between the 
Finns and Russians have been for a long 
time highly sceptical, local attitudes towards 
Russian tourism are gradually becoming 
more favourable. They are now perceived 
as being a significant factor for the eco-
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nomic success of the Finnish border areas, 
as they spend a lot of money there. Russian 
has never been a particularly popular lan­
guage among Finnish students, but eco­
nomic facts are now making it increasingly 
more popular, e.g. for the facilitation of 
business in south-eastern Finland (19). 
Since the signing of the agreement on 'co­
operation between neighbouring areas' be­
tween Finland and Russia in 1992, the local 
authorities on both sides have actively pro­
moted cross-border action to open up routes, 
establish connections and develop the econ­
omy of the border area. The total number of 
crossing-points is now 26, including six that 
are open to international traffic. The other 
20 crossing-points are intended for goods 
traffic-mainly timber transport-and/or 
crossings by Finnish and Russian citizens 
only (19). 
Total border crossings by passengers rose 
from O. 96 to 4 .1 million between 1990 and 
1996, the number of Russian passengers in­
creasing rapidly from 1994 onwards, to 
reach almost two million in 1997, while the 
number of Finns seems to be decreasing af­
ter the first boom. This is probably due to 
the fact that the old Karelian refugees have 
now visited their former home areas and 
have often failed to find any concrete fea­
tures to match against their memories, so 
that this specific form of tourism and 
movement across the border has reached 
'saturation point'. On the other hand, visits 
by Russians to Finland have been increasing 
continually, in spite of the serious economic 
problems. The well-off Russians are in­
creasingly eager to come to Finland to spend 
their holidays at spas and other holiday re­
sorts. The increasing flows of people have 
also created images of undesirable elements, 
this having been particularly true at the time 
when movements across the border were 
first beginning. This has meant that topics 
such as smuggling, the threat of organized 
crime and control of alcohol flows have 
been common in the Finnish media during 
the 1990s (19). 
The activities associated with the opening of 
the Finnish-Russian border have not only 
given rise to various 'flows' but have also 
created new social and economic practices 
that are gradually turning the border areas 
into 'interdependent borderlands', to employ 
the concept of Martinez (15). Civil servants 
and entrepreneurs in Finnish border com­
munes are looking forward to shedding their 
former peripheral location and opening up 
links with areas in Russia, an optimism 
partly motivated by the chance to obtain re­
sources for this through European Union 
programmes. Much effort has been concen­
trated on developing the infrastructure for 
rendering border crossings easier-particu­
larly customs facilities and other services. 
The opening of the border has also increas­
ingly encouraged the 'place-marketing' (7) 
of border crossings: Finnish local authori­
ties and consulting firms have been active 
and many plans have been produced to re­
alize the potential of the prospective new 
regionalizations, gateways and corridors 
(19). The future international crossing point 
at Kelloselka in Northern Finland, for in­
.stance, has been presented in the Finnish 
media as a 'breathing hole' for north-eastern 
Finland, not only opening up links for busi­
ness travel and goods transport but also fa­
cilitating the passage of European tourists to 
the Kola Peninsula and of Russians to Fin­
land for shopping purposes. On the other 
hand, future expectations in south-eastern 
Finland are based very much on the huge 
population potential represented by the two 
large Russian cities, St. Petersburg and Vy­
borg. Russian trade and visitors are seen as 
being increasingly significant for the eco­
nomic development of the area, but along­
side the beneficial effects, the increasing 
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rates of alcohol consumption and crime, to­
gether with the rise in prostitution and vene­
real diseases, have been very much to the 
fore in the media (19). 
Thus major problems still exist in the border 
areas, in spite of the increase in activities 
and general optimism. The border still sepa­
rates two completely different societies, and 
the gap in standards of living between the 
two sides is among the largest in the world. 
The vast majority of Russian Karelians have 
experienced a huge deterioration in pur­
chasing power since the collapse of the So­
viet Union, even though some people have 
managed to accumulate enormous wealth. 
As far as movement across the border is 
concerned, it is clear that most Russians are 
certainly not 'happy border-crossing con­
sumers', nor will they become such for a 
very long time. It is thus very unlikely that 
this area will become an 'integrated border­
land' where people, goods and ideas 'flow' 
without restriction (19). 
EPILOGUE 
Contrary to traditional ways of understand­
ing them as fixed lines, boundaries have 
meanings that are historically and spatially 
contingent. This contingency is also mani­
fest in the possibilities for spatial movement 
and, hence, tourism. Our concrete example 
in this paper has been the changing mean­
ings of the Finnish-Russian border, which is 
a particularly interesting example of a for­
merly closed but now increasingly open 
border. It was strictly guarded and to a great 
extent closed in Soviet times, partly due to 
the fact that it was the only border between 
the leading socialist super power and a small 
western capitalist state. While it was often 
presented in the international literature of 
political geography as an example of an 
ideological boundary, it was a taboo �n Fin-
nish discourse that was seldom discussed in 
public. This reflected the vagaries of his­
tory, in that Finland had had to cede more 
than 10 percent of its area to the Soviet Un­
ion as a consequence of World War II, 
meaning the loss of the eastern part of its 
territory, the need to evacuate and resettle 
more than 400,000 Finns and the signing of 
agreements that linked the state politically to 
the grey zone between east and west. 
Since the 19th century, Karelia and its cul­
ture have been closely related to Finnish na­
tionalism and the imagined geography of 
Finland. When the physical border was 
moved westwards after the Second World 
War, the whole of former Finnish Karelia 
did so too: its people, its heritage and even 
its symbolical landscapes. Thus the local 
culture of the Karelian borderlands was con­
served, maintained, re-produced and repre­
sented after the war in those areas carrying 
the name "Karelia" that still existed inside 
Finnish territory. Since then, these "new" 
areas have been promoted as tourist re 
sources representing a historically and geo­
graphically authentic Karelian heritage. 
The border was of interest to many foreign 
visitors to Finland, and also the Finns them­
selves. Since it was closed, tourist traffic 
was allowed across it only at certain points, 
to certain Soviet cities, while most of the 
ceded areas were completely closed. The 
former inhabitants did not have any chance 
of visiting their former homes. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the border has 
become much more open and all kinds of 
activity over it have increased enormously, 
including tourism. An evaluation of the 
roles of this border shows that the same bor­
der can have different meanings according 
to the prevailing historical and social condi­
tions. All the above examples illustrate the 
fact that boundaries are not mere lines on 
maps or in the forests, but extremely mean­
ingful symbols and institutio�s, which are 
deeply sedimented in various social prac­
tices and discourses. Besides its economic 
and cultural functions, tourism is one of the 
major indicators of the more general mean­
ings attached to borders. 
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Finnish 
Northern Karelia 
Finnish 
Southern Karelia 
FIGURE 1 
Ceded Karelia 
O 50 100 km 
Contemporary regional divisions of Karelia. Finnish Karelia, or W estem Karelia, has 
traditionally included the areas of Northern and Southern Karelia (still existing by these 
names on Finnish side of the border) and the territories that Finland had to cede to the 
Soviet Union after the Second World War (the Karelian Isthmus, the Lake Ladoga area 
and the Karelian borderlands). On the Russian side, the Karelian Republic consists of the 
historical areas of Viena and Aunus and most of the ceded territories. The Isthmus 
belongs to the Leningrad administrative region (oblast). 
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Reconstructing the Karelian socio-cultural space and tourist landscapes in Eastern 
Finland. The Road of the Bard and Boundary and the numbers of military, Orthodox 
and Karelian memorials and events advertised in the various Finish Border communes 
in 1992. 
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